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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 22, 1993, the United Nations Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 808, which formally decided that an
international tribunal should be established "for the prosecution of
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.21
The substance of Resolution 808 was realized three months later on
May 25 when the Security Council adopted Resolution 827, which
formally established such a tribunal.2 The creation of the Internation-
al Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (the Tribunal)
reaffirms the necessity of punishing persons accused of criminal
violations of humanitarian law and of the laws of war, particularly
against civilians. The statute authorizing the creation of the Tribunal
also underscores the individual penal liability of offenders responsible
for such violations?
Persons in Yugoslavia's successor governments and their armed
forces, as well as some civilians, are being indicted and tried for war
crimes. Since the first indictment against Dragan Nikolic, a former
commander of a Bosnian Serb concentration camp, was announced in
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1. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/808 (1993).
2. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
3. Statute of the International Tribunal, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, art. 6, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Tribunal Statute].
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November 1994,4 fifty-one other indictments have been announced by
the Tribunal. The Tribunal indicted twenty-four Serbs in late July
1995 and six leading Bosnian Croats in November 1995 for atrocities
involving genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.5 Among
those most recently indicted as war criminals are the Bosnian Serb
leader, Radovan Karadzic, and the commander of the Bosnian Serb
military, General Ratko Mladic.6
Given the recent international resolve to punish persons who
violate humanitarian law and the laws of war, this Article has three
purposes. First, itbriefly examines the competence and jurisdictional
scope of the Tribunal. This analysis identifies the crimes for which the
Tribunal will prosecute individuals, and describes the Tribunal's legal
mandate for undertaking that responsibility. The second purpose is
to assess the nature of international legal obligations flowing from the
Tribunal's formal mandate. This analysis strives to clarify the duty of
states to comply and cooperate with the Tribunal's warrants and
orders. Some thoughts are also proffered on the general notion of
enforcement as an act of interstate conduct, with a view to explaining
how the psychology of enforcement of international norms operates
and how that process relates to the Tribunal's functions. The third
purpose is to examine what legal recourse to enforcement the Tribunal
4. On November 7, 1994, the Tribunal charged Dragan Nikolic with murder, torture, and
mutilation of Muslim prisoners. The indictment also charges Nikolic with "illegal deportation"
of Muslims. The illegal deportations are alleged to be part of the Bosnian Serb policy of "ethnic
cleansing," pursuant to which indigenous Muslims were forced out of cities and villages. See Law
of War: Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal Makes First Indictment, 10 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP.
488 (Dec. 1994). Neither the Bosnian Serbs nor the Serbian-controlled Yugoslav government
are likely to turn Nikolic over to the Tribunal. ld.
Germany, on the other hand, recently introduced preparatory legislation that would ensure
cooperation with the Tribunal and make it compulsory under German law for a summoned
witness in Germany to appear before the Tribunal in The Hague. See Andre Klip, Germany:
Draft Action on the Co-operation with the International Tribunal for War Crimes in Former
Yugoslavia (1TWCFY), 11 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 70 (Feb. 1995).
5. Marlise Simons, U.N. Tribunal Indicts Bosnian Serb Leader and a Commander, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 1995, at A9; William Drozdiak, U.N. Tribunal Indicts Six Bosnian Croats for
Crimes Against Muslims, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1995, at A8.
6. Id. In mid-February 1995, twenty-one Serbs were charged with war crimes for the
atrocities committed at the prison camp called Omarska. Roger Cohen, Tribunal Charges
Genocide by Serb, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1995, at Al. The Tribunal charged Zeljko Meakic,
commander of the Omarska Camp, with genocide and crimes against humanity and charged
twenty other Serbian commanders, guards and visitors with war crimes. Id. At that time, only
one of those indicted, Dusan Tadic, was in custody. He was charged with crimes against
humanity, rape, and group beatings of prisoners at Omarska. Id. at A2; see also Making Rules
for War: The World Tries Again, ECONOMIST, March 11, 1995, at 21 [hereinafter Making Rules
for War].
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has in the event that a government refuses to cooperate with the
Tribunal's orders for arrest and surrender of accused offenders. This
discussion considers the range of policy options available to the
Tribunal for pressuring or punishing recalcitrant governments. Finally,
some conclusions on the functioning of the Tribunal and its role in
enforcing the rule of humanitarian law are proffered for critical
reflection.
II. LAWFUL JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL
A pivotal consideration underpinning the legitimacy of the
Tribunal is that it has been established by international legal authority
and exercises a jurisdiction that is internationally conferred.
The Security Council unanimously approved the creation of the
Tribunal under Resolutions 827 and 808.' Under the United Nations
Charter, to which 185 states are now party (including the Republic of
Yugoslavia [Serbia and Montenegro], Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
Croatia), Member States are bound to abide by substantive decisions
adopted by the Security Council.8 Such Security Council decisions are
legally binding, authoritative and controlling.9 They carry the force of
law. Therefore, the creation of the Tribunal by Security Council
Resolutions 827 and 808 endows the Tribunal with international
legitimacy and authoritative jurisdiction.
III. COMPETENCE OF THE TRIBUNAL
The Tribunal has been allocated legal competence to deal with
designated crimes of an international character, perpetrated by certain
persons, during a specified time period, in a given territory." In this
respect, legal competence flows from the Tribunal Statute and its
stipulated jurisdiction over criminal subject matter. Four groups of
crimes may be prosecuted under the Tribunal Statute: (1) grave
breaches of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949;1' (2) violations of
7. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 2; S.C. Res. 808, supra note 1.
8. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1.
9. As substantiated in Article 25, "[tlhe Members of the United Nations agree to accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." Id.
art. 25.
10. Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 1.
11. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva
Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S.
82 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 6:79
the laws or customs of war; (3) acts of genocide; and (4) crimes
against humanity.'
A. Grave Breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
The clearest articulation of what constitutes grave breaches of the
1949 Geneva Conventions is found in common Article 50/51/130/147
of those instruments."' The common provision defines the "grave
breaches" of international humanitarian law that states are required
to punish, and which clearly relate to offenses prohibited by Article
3 common to all four Geneva Conventions.14  Common Article
50/51/130/147 also prescribes minimum rules applicable to situations
of armed conflict not international in character.
The Tribunal Statute incorporates the essential language of this
common "grave breaches" provision into its Article 2. Article 2 gives
the Tribunal power to prosecute persons "committing or ordering to
be committed" the following acts:
(a) wilful killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
85 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12,1949,6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention III];
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention IV].
12. Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, arts. 2-5.
13. 1949 Geneva Convention I, supra note 11, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62;
1949 Geneva Convention II, supra note 11, art. 51, 6 U.S.T. at 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116; 1949
Geneva Convention III, supra note 11, art. 130, 6 U.S.T. at 3606, 75 U.N.T.S. at 238; 1949
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 11, art. 147,6 U.S.T. at 3618,75 U.N.T.S. at 388. As defined
in the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, "grave breaches" are crimes committed against persons or
property protected by the conventions and include:
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of
the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present
Convention: wilful killing, 'torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person,
compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully
depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the
present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
. 1
14. 1949 Geneva Convention I, supra note 11, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-18, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32-
34; 1949 Geneva Convention II, supra note 11, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3220-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86-88;
1949 Geneva Convention III, supra note 11, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38;
1949 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 11, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90
(prohibiting any violence to life and person, the taking of hostages, and outrages against personal
dignity, even in conflicts not of an international character).
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health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified
by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces
of a hostile power;
(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of
fair and regular trial;
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
civilian;
(h) taking civilians as hostages."5
Two notable improvements are made in Article 2 over the 1949
Geneva Conventions. First, paragraph (b) of the Tribunal Statute
specifies "biological experiments" as a form of prohibited "inhuman
treatment." Second, the Tribunal Statute's language replaces the
notion of "protected persons" with a specific designation of "civilians."
This change protects civilians from the commission of grave breaches
of the laws of war, irrespective of whether the conflict is legally
interpreted to be an internal or an international war.
B. Violations of the Laws or Customs of War
Another important part of international humanitarian law
embodied in the Tribunal Statute is derived from the 1907 Hague
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
(1907 Hague Convention) and regulations annexed thereto (1907
Hague Regulations). 6 As prescribed in the Tribunal Statute, persons
may be prosecuted for violating the laws or customs of war, including,
but not restricted to, the following:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated
to cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity;
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended
15. Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 2. Compare the language cited in common articles
50/51/130/147 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. 1949 Geneva Convention I, supra note 11,
art. 50, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62; 1949 Geneva Convention II, supra note 11, art, 51,
6 U.S.T. at 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116; 1949 Geneva Convention III, supra note 11, art. 130, 6
U.S.T. at 3606,75 U.N.T.S. at 238; 1949 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 11, art. 147,6 U.S.T.
at 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 388.
16. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October
18, 1907,36 Stat. 2277,1 Bevans 631; Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, Annex (Regulations), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295, 1 Bevans 643 [hereinafter
1907 Hague Regulations].
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towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure oft destruction or wilful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences,
historic monuments and works of art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.17
These provisions originate from Articles 23-28 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations. Significantly, they are specifically intended to punish
persons who have engaged in indiscriminate bombardment of civilian
population centers without military need or justification.
C. Genocide
It must also be realized, especially within the context of crimes
committed within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, that the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide"8 directly relates to actions to be prosecuted by the
Tribunal. 9 The Tribunal Statute makes this plain: Article 4 of the
Tribunal Statute provides that the Tribunal will prosecute persons
accused of genocide. In this provision, genocide is defined as
... any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.20
Article 4 of the Tribunal Statute goes on to stipulate that the
following acts shall be punishable:
17. Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 3; see 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 16, arts.
23, 25, 27, 28, 36 Stat. 2295, 1 Bevans 643, 648, 648, 648-49, 649.
18. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S.
277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
19. Obviously, application of the Genocide Convention is warranted by the purposeful use
of "ethnic cleansing" to drive out Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
20. Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 4, 2.
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(a) genocide;
(b) conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) attempt to commit genocide;
(e) complicity in genocide."
It is noteworthy that these paragraphs in Article 4 of the Tribunal
Statute were transposed verbatim from Articles II and III, respective-
ly, of the 1948 Genocide Convention.' Much has been made about
the incredible violence directed specifically against the Muslim
population in Bosnia and Herzegovina-violence that was motivated
principally by their ethnic, cultural and religious heritage.' Specific
inclusion in the Tribunal Statute for prosecution of the crime of
genocide is intended to redress such gross violations of international
humanitarian law.
D. Crimes Against Humanity
The Tribunal must address the most serious war crimes-those
that have been committed on a massive scale, in a systematic manner,
and which have caused acute revulsion and made necessary a direct
international response. To this end, the Tribunal has asserted its
jurisdiction over cases that allege crimes against humanity. The
United Nations General Assembly and international law in general
have adopted the view that there should not be any statute of
limitations for genocide or crimes against humanity.24 An individual's
ability to elude apprehension or detection for seven, or ten, or even
fifty years should not be a sufficient reason to permit that person to
escape punishment for acts so heinous that they would violate the very
fundamental rights of humankind.
As criminal conduct, such acts have their origins in the 1945
Nuremberg Charter.' Crimes against humanity are those aimed at
21. ld. art. 4, 3.
22. Genocide Convention, supra note 18, arts. II, III, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
23. See generally Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/1994/674 (1994) [hereinafter
Final Report of the Commission of Experts].
24. This is provided for in the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations
to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, 8 I.L.M. 68
(1969).
25. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Charter of the International Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
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any civilian population, and are prohibited in armed conflict,
regardless of its international or internal character. Article 5 of the
Tribunal Statute acknowledges this critical point and enumerates eight
categories of specific acts that will be treated as crimes against
humanity. These are: (1) murder; (2) extermination; (3) enslavement;
(4) deportation; (5) imprisonment; (6) torture; (7) rape; and (8)
persecution on political, racial and religious grounds. A ninth
category, "other inhumane acts," is included to make the list potential-
ly all-inclusive.26
The Tribunal Statute enlarges the scope of crimes against
humanity found in Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter. 7 In the case
of the former Yugoslavia, two new acts were specifically designated as
crimes against humanity: torture and rape. The heinousness and
condemnation of acts of torture finds expression in the 1984 Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment,' which is now in force and accepted as a
peremptory norm in human rights law. The crime of rape, the
criminality of which largely was overlooked in past wars, was brought
to the forefront of international attention with reports of massive
violations of women in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1992 and
1993.9 By designating rape as a crime against humanity, the gross
criminality of the act of rape in international law has been spotlighted,
and international concern has been directly focused on the need to
punish perpetrators.
A final point with regard to crimes against humanity merits
mention. The Tribunal will not specifically address crimes against the
peace, i.e., it will not prosecute persons for participation in planning
and waging of a war of aggression. The omission of crimes against the
peace from the specific language of the Tribunal Statute reflects the
problem of prosecuting such a charge. Proving such allegations would
be protracted and extraordinarily difficult. The amount of documenta-
tion containing plans and war strategies is unknown, and securing
access to military and diplomatic records of the governments
involved--especially the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (for Serbia),
as well as Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina-would not be easy.
26. Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 5.
27. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25, art. VI, 59 Stat. at 1556, 82 U.N.T.S. at 280.
28. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, entered into force June 26, 1987. G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N.
GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, 93d plen. mtg. at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39708 (1984).
29. See the discussion in Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 23, at 55-60.
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It is highly unlikely that requested documents would be duly turned
over to tribunal investigators, particularly from government leaders
who themselves may well be targets of investigation. Perpetrators of
crimes against the peace will not automatically escape prosecution,
however, because such persons will be held criminally responsible for
planning gross violations of international humanitarian law.
E. Personal Jurisdiction
The principle of individual criminal responsibility is essential for
making the Tribunal work. The Tribunal Statute addresses this
concern in Article 7, which states that "[a] person who planned,
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the
planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles
2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the
crime."3 The Tribunal thus confronts the principle that individuals
may be held criminally liable under international law, even though
their conduct might have been considered valid or even mandated by
domestic law.
It will not be enough to enforce the laws of war only against
ordinary soldiers and officers of low or mid-level rank. The Tribunal's
hand of punishment must reach up to military elites and civilian
government officials, and it does so. Article 7 of the Tribunal Statute
provides
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head
of State or Government or as a responsible Government official,
shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate
punishment.
3. The fact that any of the [criminal] acts... of the present
Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his
superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know
that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so
and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof. 1
All persons who participate in the planning, preparation or execution
of serious violations of international humanitarian law in the former
Yugoslavia share in the commission of the crime and are therefore
30. Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 7, 1.
31. Id. art. 7, 2-3.
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individually responsible. The Tribunal will also hold that principal
responsibility for war crimes carried out under orders will fall on those
who issued the orders.
IV. SOURCES OF OBLIGATION
The source of obligation for U.N. Member States to comply with
requests and orders from the Tribunal ultimately flows from the U.N.
Charter. More immediately, though, such authority emanates from
the Tribunal Statute.
The obligation of states to abide by the operative provisions of
the Tribunal Statute is rooted in two sources. First, as stated earlier,
the Tribunal Statute was created through Security Council resolutions
taken as enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter.32 The Security Council has the authority under Article 39 of
the Charter "to determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommenda-
tions, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security., 33 It was with this authority that the Security Council
created the Tribunal as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII
and as a subsidiary organ within the scope of Article 29 of the U.N.
Charter.
Security Council resolutions taken as such are binding as law and
mandatory as policy, so long as the operative paragraphs indicate a
direct imperative. That is, as fixed in Article 25 of the U.N. Charter,
members "agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council. 34  Thus, Security Council decisions cast as resolutions
constitute internationally lawful commands.
A second source of obligation derives from the action wording of
the preambular paragraphs of the Tribunal Statute. Some Security
Council actions may be merely advisory, i.e., they are recommendatory
resolutions. However, when the Security Council "decides" on an
action, it is in effect directing Member States to pursue a certain
course of policy. An act of "decision" by the Security Council is a
command, an order of legal obligation to Member States.
The resolutions adopted by the Security Council concerning an
international tribunal to deal with violations of humanitarian law in
32. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 2.
33. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
34. Id. art. 25.
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Bosnia-both for formally authorizing formation of the Tribunal and
for adopting the Tribunal Statute-are "decision" resolutions that
carry the force of law for Member States of the United Nations.
Despite its authorization under Chapter VII, the Tribunal has a
manifestly judicial purpose. That is, the Tribunal is charged with the
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1991."5 Importantly, the legal basis of the Tribunal
must not be allowed to compromise its juridical quality or impartiality.
The Tribunal must perform its functions independently of political
considerations. Moreover, the Tribunal must not be subject to the
authority or control of the Security Council in the performance of its
juridical functions. The Tribunal must not be politicized or allowed
to become a bargaining chip for trade among rival parties in the
Bosnian civil conflict.
In sum, states have clear, unambiguous obligations under the
operative elements of the Tribunal. There is little room for vagaries
of interpretation or political finesse. The Tribunal Statute, in tandem
with its adopted Rules of Procedure and Evidence,36 make this
manifestly clear.
V. STATE COOPERATION WITH THE TRIBUNAL
For the Tribunal to investigate and prosecute effectively, it must
receive full cooperation from the governments of the states in which
accused offenders are located. Such cooperation and judicial
assistance from governments is critical not only for gathering sufficient
evidence of criminal wrongdoing and producing indictments of accused
offenders, but also for securing custody of accused offenders and
surrendering them to the Tribunal for trial and prosection. Under the
Tribunal Statute, compliance by states with any requests from the
Tribunal for judicial assistance is obligatory and is not subject to
interpretation.
A. Article 29 of the Tribunal Statute
Article 29 of the Tribunal Statute is the key provision which
refers to the obligation of states to comply with the Tribunal's judicial
processes. In full, Article 29 provides:
35. Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 1.
36. See discussion infra parts V.B-C.
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1. States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal in the
investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing
serious violations of international humanitarian law.
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for
assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not
limited to:
(a) the identification and location of persons;
(b) the taking of testimony and the production of evidence;
(c) the service of documents;
(d) the arrest or detention of persons;
(e) the surrender of the transfer of the accused to the Interna-
tional Tribunal 7
The deliberate wording of Article 29 illustrates the mandatory
nature of this provision. "States shall comply without undue delay
with any request ... including, but not limited to .. ." the stated
procedures.38 Use of the command verb "shall" connotes an impera-
tive act; governments therefore are obliged to cooperate. Further-
more, a time element is inserted in the provision. Assistance must
come "without undue delay."
B. Rules of Procedure and Evidence
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted in 1994 by the
Tribunal3 9 for its work underscore the obligatory nature of state
cooperation with that court. The cooperation of states is explicitly
mandated in the execution of arrest warrants in Rule 56 of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence: "The State to which a warrant of arrest
is transmitted shall act promptly and with due diligence to ensure
proper and effective execution thereof, in accordance with article 29
of the Statute."'  Thus, Rule 56 includes the same imperative
character and the same time element as that contained in Article 29.
Further, Rule 56 avers that a government which receives an arrest
warrant from the Tribunal shall act "with all due diligence to ensure
proper and effective execution thereof . ... "'4 That government
37. Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 29.
38. Ld. (emphasis added).
39. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doe. IT/32 (14 March 1994), adopted Feb. 11, 1994,
entered into force March 14, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.LM. 484 (1994) [hereinafter Rules of
Procedure and Evidence].
40. Id. rule 56.
41. Id. rule 56.
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must act with such sufficient perseverance, industry and assiduity that
it can execute the arrest warrant in a manner that is adequate, proper
and fit to meet that stipulated obligation. Failure to conform to this
standard constitutes a breach of Rule 56, and hence, also a violation
of Article 29 of the Tribunal Statute.
Finally, one must note the qualifying clause in Rule 56 that the
state to which an arrest warrant is transmitted must act such that its
government can "ensure proper and effective execution" of that
warrant. Not only must the state concerned act with dispatch and
perseverance, it must also move to complete and make valid the arrest
of the accused. Again, to do less is to fail in the obligation articulated
in Article 29 of the Tribunal Statute.
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence also set out a mandatory
procedure after arrest of an accused offender is made. Rule 57 affirms
the obligation that once the accused is arrested, "the State concerned
shall detain him, and shall promptly notify the Registrar. The transfer
of the accused to the seat of the Tribunal shall be arranged between
the State authorities concerned and the Registrar."'4 Close examina-
tion of the provision again highlights its obligatory character. The
state concerned "shall detain him." This is not a policy decision that
a concerned state is entitled to make. Not to be overlooked, the
detaining government is also obligated to inform the Tribunal's
Registrar of this detention, and to coordinate with that agency the
ways, means and manner for transferring the accused to the Tribunal
for trial..
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence further elaborate the scope
of obligations in Article 29 of the Tribunal Statute for national
governments to cooperate. Significantly, Rule 58 goes so far as to
assert that the obligations articulated in Article 29 "shall prevail over
any legal impediment to the surrender or transfer of the accused to
the Tribunal which may exist under the national law or extradition
treaties of the State concerned."'43 In effect, the duties to comply
with the Tribunal's mandate and to cooperate with its requests
supersede other legal obligations accrued in a state's national
legislation or foreign treaties.
42. Id. rule 57.
43. Id. rule 58.
44. One conceivably could construe that Article 29 practically acts with the force of jus
cogens and operates as a peremptory norm to override national laws and extradition treaties that
might conflict with it.
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C. Determination of a Breach of Cooperation
Although the Tribunal Statute does not designate or direct any
specific agent to determine if and when the threshold of undue delay
has been breached, the unmistakable inference is that the Tribunal
will determine what is undue delay, as it is to this juridical body that
such assistance is owed and expected.
The right of the Tribunal to make this determination is further
confirmed by stipulations in its Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
When a state fails to execute a warrant of arrest, the state concerned
is mandated under Rule 59 to notify the Registrar of that failure and
the reasons for it. Far more than this, Rules 59 and 61 emerge as
critical provisions underpinning Article 29 of the Tribunal Statute and
its enforcement. Rule 59 provides that:
If, within a reasonable time after the warrant of arrest has been
transmitted to the State, no report is made on action taken, this
shall be deemed a failure to execute the warrant of arrest and the
Tribunal, through the President, may notify the Security Council
accordingly.45
The state's duty to report back to the Tribunal is key. If a report is
not made, that government will be in violation of the Tribunal Statute,
and could hence be susceptible to Security Council action.
Obviously, the critical consideration in Rule 59 is the notion that
"a reasonable time" should pass after transmission of the arrest
warrant. The duration associated with a "reasonable" amount of time
is undefined and subjective. One might construe a reasonable time to
mean a sensible period, one that is not immoderate, excessive, or
intolerable. Again, gauging the extent of a reasonable period remains
a determination to be made by the Tribunal.
Rule 61 deals with procedures applicable when a state fails to
execute an international arrest warrant issued by the Trial Chamber
of the Tribunal.46 The Prosecutor must satisfy the Trial Chamber that
a failure to effect personal service of the indictment is "due in whole
or in part to a failure or refusal of a State to cooperate with that
Tribunal in accordance with Article 29 of the [Tribunal's] Statute."47
45. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 39, rule 59, B.
46. 1d. rule 61.
47. Id.
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If such contention can be demonstrated, the Trial Chamber is
mandated to so certify, and the President of the Tribunal is directed
to notify the Security Council.4"
The clear implication here is that any responsive or punitive
action taken against the delinquent government will be decided upon
and imposed by the Security Council acting as the Tribunal's
enforcement agent. The Tribunal itself does not have the means to
physically effect its orders; it does not have an appointed army,
designated marshals, or police force at its disposal Consequently, it
is natural under the U.N. Charter that the principal agent entrusted
with the responsibility of enforcing the Tribunal's orders is the
Security Council.
VI. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENFORCEMENT
In international relations, genuine compliance with legal norms
depends on the adequate enforcement of those norms. Enforcement
of the Tribunal's directives really means having a system of preestab-
lished threats to deal with violations of the Tribunal's established
international legal rules. Generally, then, enforcement by the
Tribunal of the Tribunal Statute that would apply to governments is
the system of deterrence inherent in criminal law. The Tribunal would
thus strive to induce governments to comply with its agreed laws and
rules by establishing means to punish those governments which violate
those laws and rules.
To prevent violations of the Tribunal's rules, threats of punish-
ment must be credible. It is not enough for punishment to appear
serious; there must also exist a sufficiently high degree of probability
that the Tribunal will impose punishment if laws affecting its functions
are violated. If there is little chance that a penalty will be imposed,
or if the designated penalty is perceived by governments to be slight,
then a targeted government is not likely to be deterred from violating
a particular norm of the Tribunal.
The credibility of threatened punishment by the Tribunal depends
on several factors. First, any breach of the law must be clear and
unambiguous. The norm or rule of law at stake must be apparent to
and perceptible by official decisionmakers. Actions that violate the law
must be evident, well-defined, and salient. Second, credibility depends
on the likelihood that (1) the Tribunal will reach a decision that a
48. Id.
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penalty ought to be imposed; (2) that the Security Council will concur
with that conclusion; and (3) that a decision by the Security Council
to punish the violator government will be implemented.
The bottom line of deterrence thus lies in choice by an individual
policymaker. The threat of punishment causes a person to make the
"good" or "right" rather than "bad" or "wrong" choice. It is a matter
of weighing costs and benefits. If policymakers in a government
determine that it is more advantageous in some circumstances to
refuse to comply with the Tribunal's requirement of cooperation, then
a government is likely to violate that rule. If the costs of violating the
law are perceived as outweighing derivative gains, then compliance is
more likely to be forthcoming.
VII. ENFORCEMENT ACTION AND THE TRIBUNAL
Enforcement is clearly central to the success of any international
tribunal of this nature. In this regard, the experience of the Tribunal
is likely to raise several questions. What recourse does the Tribunal
have in the event that a government refuses to comply with a request
from the Tribunal for its cooperation or judicial assistance? What
remedies might the Tribunal seek to induce or compel the assistance
of a government that intentionally refuses to cooperate? What
measures might be used to pressure recalcitrant leaders of an
offending state to come into compliance with the Tribunal's requests
for assistance in securing testimony, obtaining evidence, arresting
accused offenders, or surrendering persons for prosecution? What
policy options are available to the Tribunal in order to persuade
governments to fulfill these international obligations under the U.N.
Charter and the Tribunal Statute?
In similar fashion, if pressure to comply is unsuccessful, what
measures might be employed to punish governments that flaunt these
obligations? Simply put, compliance with the provisions in Article 29
is expected by the Tribunal. What actions can be taken against a
government that fails to live up fully, promptly, and properly to that
duty to comply?
A. The Security Council
It is essential to keep in mind that the Tribunal was established
by a decision based on Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Such a
decision creates a binding legal obligation on all Member States of the
United Nations to take whatever steps are necessary to implement the
decision. An order by the Trial Chamber for the surrender or transfer
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of an accused person to the custody of the Tribunal is therefore an
application of a measure under Chapter VII.
If states fail to fully comply with an order from the Tribunal, the
Security Council is responsible for its enforcement, as provided for in
Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. Under Article 41, the Security
Council is empowered with the authority to enforce its decision
through "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and
of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations., 49 If the
Security Council chose to proceed under Article 41 against an
uncooperative state, the Security Council would likely authorize the
establishment of a Sanctions Committee to oversee and coordinate
international economic coercion against that state.
A number of tactics are available to the Security Council in its
regort to nonmilitary sanctions. For example, a boycott might be
imposed against that state's commerce. A boycott might entail a
complete prohibition on the import of all commodities and products
originating in the recalcitrant state.
The sanctions operation might also be reinforced by the imposi-
tion of an embargo against the export of goods or services to the
uncooperative state. While the embargo should be comprehensive in
scope, provision might be included for exceptions in the case of
humanitarian aid or medical supplies.
U.N. sanctions might also include financial restrictions against the
uncooperative government. In an effort to intensify economic
isolation, the Security Council could authorize a complete ban on
financial transactions and transfers of funds to that government or any
national entity in that country. Such actions might include imposition
of freezes on that government's assets in foreign states and blocking
mechanisms for its loans in international lending institutions.
The imposition of contract restrictions on pre-sanctions commer-
cial arrangements with the recalcitrant state would provide another
dimension of the Security Council sanctions effort. Any and all
contractual obligations held by states or their nationals with the
uncooperative government would be suspended.
49. U.N. CHARTER art. 41. For a general discussion, see Christopher C. Joyner, Collective
Sanctions as Peaceful Coercion: Lessons from the United Nations Experience, 16 AUSTRALIAN
Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1995). Moral condemnation is also available as a sanction for noncompliance,
but seldom has it been very effective in persuading governments to comply with United Nations'
directives.
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To enforce these sanctions, imposition of a multinational naval
interdiction could be ordered by the Security Council. Naval forces
of Member States would have to be recruited by the Security Council
to perform this interdiction task. A naval blockade would require
verification of cargoes and destinations of shipping and could, with
Security Council authorization, include the search and seizure of
vessels found to be in violation of the sanctions regime.
The Security Council could also mandate initiation of an air
embargo to complement the naval interdiction. Such a Security
Council order could forbid the takeoff and landing from the territory
of all states' aircraft from the target state, except for a specially
designated shipment sent for humanitarian or medical reasons.
Supervision of the air embargo would be entrusted to the Sanctions
Committee, which would receive reports of implementation measures
taken by the states.
Still another facet of international sanctions might involve travel
restrictions by all governments on their own nationals going to and
from the uncooperative state, as well as on nationals from the target
state wishing to enter their country.
Finally, instigation of an arms embargo against the recalcitrant
government would be fundamental to a U.N. sanctions effort. A
general embargo might be placed on the transfer of weapons and
military equipment, as well as services related to technical support and
training, to the uncooperative state. To induce added pressure on
those governments already being embargoed-Yugoslavia, Bosnia, and
Croatia-the Security Council might even consider lifting the arms
embargo against Muslim factions in Bosnia, but not on the other states
in the region.
These various dimensions of sanctions are not new to the Security
Council. The Security Council has already employed such sanctions
during the past three decades in varying ways, with various degrees of
success, against Rhodesia,0 South Africa,5 ' Iraq, 2 Libya,5 3 Serbia 4 and
50. The Security Council first imposed sanctions against Rhodesia by Resolution 232,
adopted on December 16, 1966. S.C. Res. 232, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1340th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/232 (1966). Security Council Resolution 221, adopted on April 9, 1966, strengthened the
sanctions operation, as it authorized Great Britain's interception of ships carrying oil to the port
of Beria. S.C. Res. 221, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1277th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/221 (1966).
Security Council Resolution 253, adopted on May 29, 1968, imposed a total ban on imports to
and exports from Rhodesia, and created a special sanctions committee. S.C. Res. 253, U.N.
SCOR, 23d Sess., 1428th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/253 (1968); see Margaret Doxey, International
Sanctions in Theory and Practice, 15 CAsE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 276 (1983).
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51. The Security Council imposed sanctions against South Africa to pressure the white
minority government to abandon apartheid policies and human rights abuses and foster black
majority rule. Resolution 418 of November 8, 1977, ordered a mandatory arms embargo to be
applied universally to South Africa. S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32d Sess., 2046th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/418 (1977). Security Council Resolution 569, adopted on July 26, 1985, authorized
voluntary, selective sanctions against South Africa. S.C. Res. 569, U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2602d
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/569 (1985). Recent developments in South Africa leading to
dismantlement of the apartheid system and black majority rule resulted in lifting of these
international sanctions. See Mark Mathabane, The World After Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
1991, at A15.
52. The most sweeping sanctions effort to date authorized by the Security Council is that
being applied to Iraq, resulting from its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Given the unprece-
dented international consensus for condemnation of Iraq and the impressive scope of U.N.-
approved action taken against that state, much in the way of lessons for sanctions operations can
be gleaned from the Iraqi sanctions experience.
On August 1, 1990, Iraqi tanks and troops invaded and quickly conquered its small but oil
rich neighbor, Kuwait. In response to the urgent request of Kuwait, the Security Council
convened on August 2, 1990 to consider the invasion of that state by Iraqi forces. The Security
Council adopted Resolution 660, citing its authority under Articles 39 and 40 and announcing
its determination that a breach of international peace had occurred. The resolution condemned
the invasion, called for the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, and announced
that the Security Council would meet as necessary to ensure compliance with that mandate. S.C.
Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990).
This Security Council action initiated a protracted series of at least sixteen resolutions aimed
at condemning various policies and activities by Iraq and at taking measures to compel that
government to cease, desist and amend its transgressions against Kuwait, and human rights
abuses against its own citizens. Taken in tandem, these Security Council resolutions established
the legal mandate through which international economic sanctions were imposed against Iraq.
On August 6, 1990, the Security Council adopted Resolution 661, which imposed
comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990). The
Security Council also established a Sanctions Committee to monitor implementation of and
compliance with the mandatory measures. The prescript of this resolution furnishes the
foundation upon which the sanctions regime against Iraq was constructed. For an assessment of
this sanctions regime, see Christopher C. Joyner, Sanctions, Compliance and International Law:
Reflections on the United Nations' Experience Against Iraq, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1991).
53. The Security Council imposed sanctions against Libya on March 31,1992 on account of
that government's support of international terrorism and its refusal to surrender to the United
States or to the United Kingdom two Libyan nationals indicted for the bombing of the Pan Am
103 aircraft over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1989. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3063d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992). For an assessment of the international legal
implications for extradition of this episode, see Christopher C. Joyner and Wayne Rothbaum,
Libya and the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie What Lessons for International Extradition Law?, 14
MICH. J. INT'L L. 222 (1993).
54. The Security Council imposed sanctions in 1992 against the government of Serbia in
reaction to its aggression against and massive violations of human rights in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRESI713 (1992);
S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992); S.C. Res. 787,
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES787 (1992). Additional sanctions against
Yugoslavia were authorized by the Security Council on April 17, 1993. These U.N. sanctions
include a worldwide freeze on all Yugoslav assets, as well as a seizure of all Yugoslav aircraft,
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Haiti.55
Resort by the Security Council to use of military force against a
recalcitrant government also remains legally and theoretically possible.
Under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter, should nonmilitary measures
prove inadequate, the Security Council is empowered to "take such
[military] action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. 56 Such actions
to this end "may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces" from U.N. Member States."
The Security Council might find it relatively convenient to hire,
deputize or call upon one or more national governments to inflict
military punishment on an offending government in order to imple-
ment a decision. Still, such a limited military option, as well as any
large scale military action, appears remote on legal, practical and
political grounds.
It may be difficult to make a compelling argument that a state's
refusal to surrender an accused offender to the Tribunal would
constitute a sufficiently grave breach of or threat to the peace such
that massive use of military violence by the Security Council is
warranted. The use of force in such a situation would grossly exceed
the traditional legal limitations of necessity and proportionality
associated with the lawful use of force.
On a fundamentally political level, it would indeed be paradoxi-
cal to expect that the Security Council-especially its five permanent
members-would be willing to authorize use of military force to
punish a government's refusal to comply with a request from the
Tribunal. This doubt seems especially acute given that those same
five Great Powers have been so manifestly unwilling to authorize the
ships, trucks and other vehicles on foreign territory. In addition, the new sanctions ban
shipments of most goods by air, land, and water to and from Yugoslavia, block shipping through
Yugoslavia via the Danube River, forbid foreign vessels from approaching within twelve miles
of Yugoslavia's Adriatic coast, and specify strict new penalties for persons or states that violate
the trade ban. Medicine, food and humanitarian supplies and service are exempt from the
sanctions. See David B. Ottaway, New Yugoslav Sanctions Take Effect, WASH. POST, Apr. 27,
1993, at Al. For an assessment of the human rights implications of the Bosnian tragedy, see
Christopher C. Joyner, Enforcing Human Rights Standards in the Former Yugoslavia: The Case
for An International War Crimes Tribunal, 22 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 235 (1994).
55. The Security Council imposed a mandatory oil embargo and related sanctions, including
an embargo on arms, police equipment, and petroleum products, and a freeze of the assets of
the Haitian government and its de facto authorities. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3238th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (1993).
56. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
57. Id.
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use of U.N. forces to halt the mass killings, rapes and other pervasive
acts of brutality that have marked the human tragedy of "ethnic
cleansing" in Bosnia since 1992.
B. Difficulties of Enforcement
There is another dimension to the difficulty of enforcing the
Tribunal's orders, namely, the profound lack of financial resources
allocated by the United Nations for the Tribunal's work. As the
Tribunal's Prosecutor, Judge Richard J. Goldstone, noted recently, the
financial resource problem is critical.5" The United Nations has no
experience in dealing with the war crimes tribunal process, its
bureaucracy, and its personnel needs. As a result, there is little
appreciation for the diverse resource needs of the investigative and
prosecutorial processes. The proposed budget for the Tribunal's
prosecution has no surplus at all. Recent estimates suggest that even
with a proposed budget for 1995 of $34.6 million, substantial increases
are needed to finance critical aspects of the Tribunal's function, such
as mass grave exhumation, travel for witnesses and the accused, and
laboratory expenses.5 9 Without adequate funding, the Tribunal will be
unable to perform sufficient investigation into alleged violations of
humanitarian law, nor will it be able to prepare cases adequately for
trial and prosecution of those who have been indicted.' The
conclusion here is obvious. If the Tribunal is not able to have its
operation adequately financed, it will not be able to carry out its
mission to enforce humanitarian law and prosecute those who have
58. See Law of War A: Prosecutor for Former Yugoslavia War Crimes Sets Agenda, 11 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 27-28 (Jan. 1995) [hereinafter Prosecutor Sets Agenda].
59. As detailed by Judge Goldstone, in October 1994 the Tribunal's prosecutor and
Registrar submitted to the U.N. Controller a proposed budget of $34.4 million. See Report of
the Secretary-General as requested by the General Assembly in Resolution 47/235, Revised
Estimates Financing of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 5th Comm., 48th Sess., Agenda Item 159, addendum 1,
U.N. Doc AIC.5148144 (1994). The budget does not include funds needed for several critical
activities, including two to four mass grave exhumations ($5-10 million); defense counsel and
support services ($2 million); travel for witnesses ($1 million); witness counseling and security
($500,000); witness protection program ($5-10 million); travel of the accused ($200,000); expert
witnesses for the prosecutor ($100,000); and laboratory expenses ($1 million). The funds needed
above the budgetary request are estimated to range between $14.8 and $24.8 million. Prosecutor
Sets Agenda, supra note 58, at 28.
As of March 1995, the Tribunal had received only $7 million from the United Nations.
There is as yet no full budget allocation for 1995. Making Rules for War, supra note 6, at 22.
60. Prosecutor Sets Agenda, supra note 58, at 27-28.
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breached those norms. If the United Nations is not willing or able to
fund all operations of the Tribunal's work, then state governments
must voluntarily contribute to make up the difference.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Tribunal Statute sets out the competence of the Tribunal
with respect to the law that it may apply, as well as the persons to
whom the law will apply. Included here are considerations regarding
the principle of individual criminal responsibility, the Tribunal's
territorial and temporal reach, and the relations of its work to national
courts.
The wording in Article 29 of the Tribunal Statute was carefully
crafted such that states must cooperate with the Tribunal. Compliance
is not an option; it is flatly an obligation.
Should a government fail to comply with an order from the
Tribunal for cooperation or judicial assistance, the U.N. Security
Council inherits the responsibility to undertake enforcement or
punitive action against that government. The Security Council must
determine what, if any, measures should be taken against that
government for its delict.
The political efficacy of enforcement action imposed by the
Security Council will be only as strong as U.N. Member States permit
it to be. That is the essence of political effectiveness. States must
work together to make sanctions work well. In previous Security
Council enforcement actions, governments have not cooperated in
uniform, coordinated, and consistent ways. As a result, sanctions have
been rendered less effective as instruments of international enforce-
ment.
This Article thus returns full circle to the premise that effective
enforcement of the Tribunal's directives turns on perceptions and
choices by national governments. If a government believes that a
credible threat-one that is real and unacceptable to its national
interests-will be triggered by failure to cooperate with the Tribunal,
then that government seems likely to abide by that obligation. If, on
the other hand, a government should determine that actions taken by
the Security Council to punish uncooperative governments will be
relatively painless, or less than compelling, then that government will
not be deterred from violating obligations to cooperate with and assist
the Tribunal. Regrettably, the record of past compliance with
mandatory nonmilitary U.N. sanctions against various states does not
foster much optimism about effective enforcement by the Security
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Council of the Tribunal's orders for cooperation by states in securing
evidence, arrests and surrender of indicted persons.
Political will is the key to effectively enforcing the work of the
Tribunal. When credibility and deterrence break down in the
perceptions of certain governments, members of the Security Council
in particular and the United Nations in general must exercise sufficient
political will, national determination and sometimes economic sacrifice
to make international enforcement actions work. The Tribunal must
be given adequate financial resources to carry out its prosecutorial
mandate. A government must genuinely believe that enforcement of
a Security Council decision to impose sanctions is in its national
interest, and it must be willing to cooperate with other governments
toward that end. Otherwise, enforcement actions imposed by the
Security Council against some recalcitrant state will be more sieve
than substance, more of an impotent symbol than a viable policy.
Such failure would do much to undercut the lawful authority and
political credibility of the Tribunal.
In the end, however, the work of the Tribunal will not be gauged
by political events. The Tribunal stands on its own as a symbol
against complacency and indifference when basic human rights are
egregiously violated. Realism about the Tribunal's prospects of having
its obligations enforced must not degenerate into cynicism about either
its purpose or importance.
The Tribunal is empowered to request the U.N. Security Council
to take action against any government that fails to cooperate with it.
It is here that a core lesson for humanitarian law emerges from this
experience: the more serious governments are about the Tribunal, the
greater the potential deterrent the Tribunal will be. The Tribunal can
make a difference. It can punish war criminals. It can serve as a
deterrent to potential aggressors. It does strengthen the fabric of
humanitarian law and the laws of war, especially by placing the force
and prestige of international law on the side of the victims. That in
itself remains a noble tribute to the rule of law in this post-Cold War
era of pervasive civil strife and ethno-nationalistic turmoil.

